'All the fives' was the Maxi's high technology tag line when launched - with a five door hatchback body and five speed gearbox, Austin's new mid-range fighter really did seem to have it all.
Sadly, the technology might have been there, but the execution was a little less than marvellous, and this avant garde car failed to sell as a result. During its 12-year production run, it did win quite a few friends, though...
Five-star car misses the boat
HE Austin Maxi was created out
of the desperate need to replace the ageing Farina
saloons, which had been selling steadily since their launch in 1958. Originally,
the
ADO17 had been conceived for the task, but due to a certain amount of project
drift Alec
Issigonis' final solution proved too large and too fast – and weren't really
up to the task of replacing these important mid-liners. Sadly, the Oxford and
Cambridge
saloons were fighting a rearguard action against the Ford
Cortina – but didn't have the armoury to do the Ford-fighting job their
long production run had forced them into.
When it became clear the ADO17 was not selling, a plan was put into place. BMC decided the only way forward was to produce a brand new car to fill the gap between ADO16 and ADO17. Serious work on the new car began in mid-1965 – and before the Maxi's project code of ADO14 was dreamed-up, it was known internally as the 'ADO16 3/8'. The implication of that tag was obvious – the new new car's wheelbase was roughly three-eights of the way between the two cars, exactly 100 inches.
Of course, it didn't long for this agreeable baseline to fall apart. The first major decision (taken by George Harriman himself) to upset the applecart, was to use the 1800's doors. They might have been effective doors, but pretty they weren't, and more worryingly, their use would force the new car's wheelbase close to 106-inches – massively longer than the Cortina.
More alarmingly, it also meant all Austin-badged cars between 1.5- and 3-litres would feature similarly styled centre sections.
New engine, new factory...
ADO14 would result in being an project because of the adoption of a new engine and gearbox. Any money saving measures adopted in the design of the body would have quickly been negated. A requirement in any effective Cortina-fighter needed to be an engine range spanning 1.3- to 1.5-litres. This ruled out the A-Series stright away - as it had only recently been stretched to 1.3-litres in the Mini Cooper, and engineers felt that was the limit of development. Reflecting BMC's bold ambitions of the time, it was decided that an all-new engine was needed. As Alec Issigonis headed up the project, nothing less than cutting edge would do - so it featured an overhead camshaft and plenty of upgrade potential an anticipation of future events.
As the marketing department were forecasting sales of 6000 Maxis a week, it was decided the new engine needed a new factory to build it - located at Cofton Hackett, near Longbridge. The site of the plant was exactly right (Cofton Hackett is on the main road out of Longbridge), but sadly, the planning was all wrong.
The engineering of the E-Series engine was compromised in order to facilitate upward expansion – Issigonis decided upper range E-Series engines should have an extra pair of cylinders, not more engine capacity, as more usually the case. That meant it needed to be ultra compact in order to fit transversely into the engine bays of BMC's front wheel drive range. Engineers facilitated this by the adoption of siamesed cylinder bores, meaning there was no water jacketing between the pots. This design had advantages, but it meant the four-cylinder version was seemingly stuck with a 1500cc ceiling.
A change of tack
During
the early stages of development of BMC's Cortina fighter, George
Harriman decreed the company would no longer enter into direct competition
with Ford - a statement which immediately rendered the ADO14 as it was developing
redundant.
Turning a set-back into an opportunity, BMC engineers took decided to radically alter the focus of the new car. Because ADO14 was no longer a Cortina rival, the 1.3-litre version was abandoned. All further development would be concentrated on the 1485cc E4- and 2227cc E6-Series versions. Hindsight has us ruing this chain of events - had the 1.3-litre version remained, it would have resulted in a 2-litre E6 engine – perfect for products British Leyland would subsequently offer.
ADO14 would also become a high-technology showcase for BMC's capabilities - and that led to the decision to design a five-speed gearbox, the famous hatchback rear end, and its adaptable and spacious interior. Product Planners were beginning to see a British version of the Renault 16, and liked what they saw, because it was better – having benefited from several years' further development over the 1965-vintage Renault.
Those doors
A closer look at the rear of the four-door Maxi bodyshell
A major problem for ADO14 designers was how to give it a palatable style when it had been lumbered with those ADO17 doors. The result was an unappealing situation which made it almost impossible to make the new car significantly smaller than the ADO17 (that car that was already blessed with compact front and rear overhangs).
That resulted in a crisis of confidence over the ADO14's looks - and along the way, it received a couple of hasty makeovers. The first was in 1967. When became clear British Motor Holdings (BMC's parent company, since the purchase of Jaguar in 1966) was deep in the mire, Joe Edwards ended up poring over the company's affairs. When it came to the ADO14, he came to the conclusion its looks simply didn't add-up, and was well-aware of the commercial significance of the new car, and that the whole future of BMH may hinge on its success.
Because of this, he ordered a restyle of the front end. Ex-Ford Design Director, Roy Haynes was tasked with giving the ADO14 a more definite identity – and landed it with a suspiciously Cortina-esque grille and headlight arrangement. Edwards could not order the designers to go any further because, the majority of the body panels had been signed-off and Pressed Steel was already in the process of building body presses.
The car would not prove to be the saviour of BMH. The development of the ADO14 was, at the time, probably the worst kept secret in the British motor industry. In The Times of 22nd April 1968, the story, Styling troubles delay new BMC saloon, Geoffrey Charles went on to describe the evoloution of the external style. Charles later revealed how he was privy to so much information.
'We must jump back to late 1964, when BMC chairman, George Harriman, and his technical director, Alec Issigonis, first showed me ADO14, hidden in the secret projects department at Longbridge. It was almost indistinguishable from the then new 1800; sporting a roof-hinged tailgate and five gears, but decidedly ugly around its snub nose and chopped-off hindquarters. The concept was pure Issigonis: two box body, maximum passenger space, minimum engine room and to hell with styling, Pininfarina must not run riot here...'
As events transpired, the ADO14 ended up being the first car launched by the British Leyland Motor Corporation. When Donald Stokes took over the ailing company in January 1968, he looked at the Maxi and decided it needed more work to be made a saleable proposition. That resulted in its second pre-launch facelift. So little could be done by this point, all that was chaged was the interior – giving it some semblance of habitability - and some very minor exterior detailing.
Making it all work...
Stokes
drafted in Harry
Webster (cruelly pushing Issigonis aside in the process) from Triumph to
put right what he saw as the ills of Austin-Morris. Prime suspect on that list
was the Maxi.
So many faults were identified by the new management that Harry's team would end up having their work cut out trying to make good and mend the Maxi. Top of the list of problems for many was the new car's appalling cable-operated gearbox (pictured left). In the end, the engineers did much pre-launch tinkering to make the gearbox work, but knew that curing its ills would neccessitate a new linkage design.
These weren't the only problems – by December, Webster was also hearing loud and clear from his engineers the message that the 1485cc E-series engine wasn't up to the task of shifting the Maxi's bulk. He tasked them with developing more a powerful version (not an easy task given the unconventional nature of the engine block design), and this would take time.
As with the adoption of new gear linkages, the 1748cc variation of the E-series engine would need over a year to be made production-ready and ended up adding £1 million to the final cost of the ADO14 development programme.
Stokes agonized over the Maxi, questioning whether it should be launched at all. But in the end he decided there was no option but to push the 'launch' button; the car needed to go because of all the investment ploughed in to the new Cofton Hackett engine facility.
So, the laughably optimistic product planning by BMC back in 1966 had saved the new car's bacon under the auspices of BLMC's new management regime - ironic really. Stokes pushed forward with the launch - pencilling in a date Spring of 1969. Webster's modifications would have to wait until it was feasible to incorporate them as a series running improvements to the Maxi.
Getting Maxi off the ground
Like the Mini and 1800 before it, the Maxi was designed in a very functional way. It is a pleasing shape in retrospect, but in the style conscious 1960s, it was not what buyers wanted. (Picture kindly supplied by Graham Arnold)
The influence of Roy Haynes' ex-Ford design principles are clear to see in the Maxi's interior. Unlike Issigonis' earlier offerings, the Maxi interior was more obviously design-led. In fact, it was almost a clone of the designs offered by Ford at the time. (Picture kindly supplied by Graham Arnold)
In terms of marketing the Maxi, it would fit in perfectly with the plans that Stokes had for the Austin marque and how it fit into BLMC overall strategy.
BLMC's management was not shy in coming forwards with a long list of the sins of BMC in the past, the chief among those being that of badge engineering. In August 1968, the policy was set in place by Stokes that no new British Leyland cars would be badge engineered. Within the group, Austin's role would be to represent the high technology end of the market whereas Morris would be developed into a marque that produced cars to fight Ford head on.
Because the ADO14 fitted into the former category perfectly, it was an obvious candidate for the Austin namemplate, and therefore was introduced to replace the Austin A60 only (the Morris Oxford would have to live on for another two years). In his heart of hearts, Stokes knew that the Maxi wasn't good enough, and his strategists were telling him so: their projections were that the Maxi would - at best - take a 4 per cent share of the UK Market.
But by this time, it was envisaged that the car would only be in production for a few years, to be replaced by the sweeping range of new Leyland-engineered cars.
By January 1969, the press was reporting that the Leyland 1500 would be badged as an Austin. The head of the Austin Morris division, George Turnbull was reported as saying that the new car would not go on sale until it was absolutely ready. "Preparation and testing, and then more preparation and testing, was my policy at Standard Triumph and it remains my Policy here."
He was quoted as saying, as well, "We are doing tens of thousands of miles of road testing and general bashing about. The success of the 1500 is of the utmost importance to everyone in the Austin Morris division. It is aimed at the biggest growth sector of the market and I don't want it going off half cock, even if it means holding the car back for a time."
Mixed reception from the press
And here it is - the Maxi's raison d'etre: the huge, practical and versatile
boot. Here was an area that the Maxi had an advantage over all its rivals, including
the vivacious Renault
16.
As it was, the Maxi was launched in Estoril, Portugal in May 1969 and it was immediately apparent a new management regime was running the show. Harry Webster briefed the assembled journalists on the Maxi's finer points, and not the old 'Austin' design team. Webster had his work cut out selling the Maxi to the assembled press, and this was to prove even more traumatic after they actually drove the new car.
To say that the initial driving impressions were underwhelming is an understatement: journalists came away with the distinct feeling that not only was the Maxi was underpowered, it also suffered from heavy and low geared steering. The failing that overshadowed all others, though, was the appalling gear change: of course, the Maxi offered the advantage of a 5-speed gearbox, but the badly engineered cable operated shift resulted in a bad gear change. Many testers were left with the uneasy feeling that they never really knew whether it was going actually slot into gear or not. Gearchanging should never be stressful – in the Maxi, it was. Julian Mounter, motoring correspondent of The Times summed up the gearchange thus: 'It feels like stirring treacle with a long thin cane.'
Nevertheless, these shortcomings aside, the Maxi was an interesting concept with a great deal to recommend it. For a start, it was wonderfully commodious. Like the Issigonis-engineered cars that preceded it, the Maxi was blessed with keen roadholding and tremendous ride quality. Unlike its older counterparts, however, the Maxi was also a quiet and long-legged motorway cruiser, thanks to its overdriven top gear. Unlike its principle rival, the Renault 16, the Maxi’s hatchback arrangement was straightforward in the extreme. It also had the added advantage of being able to fold all the seats down flat (to make some kind of lumpy double bed).
All that the Maxi really needed in order to become a good car was more power, an acceptable gear change and, most importantly, a well-styled body.
At the time of the Maxi's launch, Lord Stokes was publicly bullish about the cars prospects. "We have made certain that ample supplies are available in our distributors' and dealers' sbowrooms. In fact, almost 5000 are in their hands at this moment, and with a production rate now running at 2000 a week, the car will quickly become a very familiar sight on our roads so that customers won't have to wait too long to get one. We are passing the starting line at a gallop as far as production of this car is concerned."
He described the car as, "...the most thoroughly tested and proved model the motor industry has ever produced. We have done over a million miles of intensive testing with it up and down the motorways of Europe. in the hot summer of Portugal. and even inside the Arctic Circle in Lapland last winter."
George Turnbull was also quoted at the time as saying, "I consider it a must if you're selling in the family sector of the market and are going to spend heavily on advertising and sales promotion, to stock your dealers up before the fanfare. You can't afford to go into a launch with 500 cars, keeping your fingers crossed. Your dealers must have one or two cars apiece, and distributors considerably more, with a plentiful supply to follow up. I would be very sorry if we have less than 5000 on announcement day, allowing at least two per dealer, and we ought to have something like 7000. Output? We will certainly do 100,000 a year, maybe up to 150,000 even in the first year."
Although, the Leyland men would later distance themselves from the Maxi's development and shift blame onto BMC, publicly they were enthusiastic about the new car. Lord Stokes gave The Guardian newspaper perhaps the best quote of all: 'Our designers and market research men have carried out detailed studies on the socialogical needs of the seventies and the impact on the automobile and we firmly believe that the Maxi will fulfill the majority of requirements of the middle class motorist in this context.'
Project Aquila: the stylish Maxi
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Buyers didn't love it, either...
Unfortunately, the Maxi was greeted with total apathy from the British car buying public – and it is easy to see why. For a start, most people failed to understand the Maxi; it was a great concept let down by fairly fundamental detailing, not least the styling. Whereas the Cortina (despite what Harriman may have decreed, it was a rival to the Maxi) was crisply-styled and was availble in a multitude of options, the Maxi was a one-model show: five-doors and five-speeds, take-it-or-leave-it...
The Maxi did enjoy a brief honeymoon with carbuyers, by mid May 1969 the press were reporting that Cowley was introducing a nightshift and that the orderbook for the car amounted to five months production. George Turnbull was quoted as saying, "We are very encouraged by the response of our distributors, dealers and public, to the Maxi. Our only anxiety is that we should fulfil these orders as quickly as possible. We are doing everything we can to build up production."
However a series of stoppages, mainly by Pressed Steel Fisher at Cowley, which supplied Maxi body shells tested the patience of the potential customers who had a Maxi on order. Gradually weekly Maxi production dropped from the planned 2000 a week to 1800, then 1600 and by September 1969 BLMC revealed it was dropping further still to 1300.
In The Times of 16 September 1969, Giles Smith wrote, "The share of the British car market won by British Leyland's new and much publicized Maxi , production of which will be cut back for the second time in a month later this month, dropped to less than 2.5 per cent in the three months following its April launch it was understood last night. Maxi models are estimated to have had a 3.3 per cent share of the May market, 2.5 per cent in June, and 2.4 per cent in July.
"Indications are that sales in August are most unlikely to climb above the July figure. Leyland said last night that this had nothing to do with the production reduction at its Oxford plant and claimed the group had always been aiming at a 2 per cent initial market share figure. But sales of the new car, one of the most publicised and heavily prepared launches by the group's Austin Morris division, have clearly been a disappointment to the company's executives. It is understood the group was thinking in terms of a minimum market share of 5 per cent, possibly rising to 7 or 8 per cent; no company would seriously consider a launch of the size and cost of the Maxi's if it were not aiming at a market well above 5 per cent.
'Leyland confirmed over the weekend that output of the Maxi at Oxford, originally intended to be 2000 a week, but now some 1600 a week. would be cut back to 1300 when the plant re-opens on 29th September. The company said the cutback, involving short time working, was due to difficulties in getting bodies for the Maxi from Pressed Steel Fisher.' In fact, in September 1969, the Maxi took a mere 2.2 per cent of the UK car market, by November production had been reduced further to 1000 cars per week, and by December 1969, its market share had fallen disastrously to 1.4 per cent; a mere 681 cars.
In the 1st November 1969 edition of the Daily Express, the newspaper's motoring correspondent, Basil Cardew, outlined some of the Maxi's percieved problems: 'The Maxi has faced mounting criticism since it was launched last April. The output of Maxis is now down to 1000 cars a week - not nearly filling the assembly lines of a £24m factory to build its engine. Its sales are 2.2 per cent of the home market.
'The Maxi is said to have a ponderous gear change, excessive road noise, and disappointing performance. Its price of £979, including purchase tax, is said to be too high in relation to its closest rivals... Renault 16 (£970), Ford Cortina Estate (£958), French Simca 1100 Estate (£959), Vauxhall Victor (£949), and Hillman Minx de luxe (£851). The Maxi, say the critics, would, be all right if it were sorted out properly. It feels and sounds unrefined - with buzzes, shakes, and booms. It gives a bumpy ride and the advantage of the five-speed gearbox is offset by the tortuous gear change.
'So last night I tackled 53-year-old Lord Stokes who said: "We have 31 basic models under the British Leyland umbrella, the Maxi is only one. Yes, I have heard ,some of these criticisms but I tell you categorically, that the Maxi is here to stay at least for another 10 years. There were similar criticisms when BMC brought out its 1800 model, but now it is one of our best sellers."
'He is convinced that by next spring the Maxi will be a bestseller. The Austin-Morris 1800 was considerably modified before it gained favour: Will the Maxi also be worked on? Said Lord Stokes: "At this time we contemplate no major modifications."'
His Lordship's statement about the Maxi remaining in production for a decade is ironic, considering Sir George Harriman also made similar promises about previous Issigonis cars to the media.
Maxi was the brainchild of Sir Alec Issigonis - and BLMC wasn't shy in telling
prospective customers.
By the end of its first year on the market, the Maxi was being produced at a rate of 400 per week; a far cry from the 6000 originally envisaged. Because of its undoubted failure, and the new management's disapproval of the car, the planned lower-priced down-spec (possibly Morris-badged) four-door saloon version was dropped. The Maxi four-door was developed in parallel with the five-door car, but when it came to it, the cost of bringing the car into production would prove prohibitive – especially as the Marina was looming on the horizon.
BLMC launched a crash modification programme for the Maxi - Austin Morris Sales Director Filmer Paradise admitted, later in May 1970 that the original car, '...had some niggling faults.' Beginning on 17 December, Austin distributors were called to a series of conferences at Longbridge at which, according to Mr. Paradise, '...everybody let their hair down. We approached them with stark realism and an acceptance of their problems in selling the Maxi.' He added, 'And any salesman who is not enthusiastic, is nothing. Something had to be done.'
The results were clear - Maxi was substandard, and therefore, the unusual step of going for a full relaunch seemed like the only way of saving the Maxi. By the autumn of 1969, modifications were being introduced to the assembly line at Cowley to isolate the causes of excessive vibration and make the gear change more positive. Sound deadening material was liberally applied.
Twenty of the newly-modified cars were handed over for trial runs. Countrywide re-training of showroom salesmen was next - distributors and dealers were given financial incentives to put more than 1500 demonstrators on the road, in order to get potential buyers behind the wheel of the Maxi. Next came a mass-mailshot of 1.5 million would-be customers that the Maxi - brainchild of Sir Alec Issigonis - was well worth buying. However, the most telling move was the decision to hold the Maxi's price at £1018 during price increases, thereby increasing its competitiveness. The modified cars were met with a warmer response from Press, and by February 1970, market penetration increased to 2.2 per cent; March's was 2.5 per cent, and April climbed to over 3 per cent. By May 1970 costs for repairs under warranty were the lowest of any BLMC car, but output was now way down on the production targets originally set.
Eighteen months later on 12 October 1970 and after a lot of back-room work on the car, the 1750cc E-series version of the Maxi appeared, along with the new rod-operated gearchange - and at that point, the Maxi started to come good as a car. The new version was no less odd-looking and the steering was just as heavy and low-geared, but at least the Maxi now had a reasonable turn of speed and one could now engage gear without the constant fear of wrong-slotting it.
At launch of the revised Maxi, Austin Morris managing director George Turnbull said: 'We would be foolish not to concede that the original Maxi needed more refinement and a more positive gear selection mechanism. It is in these areas that we have concentrated our research and development.'
Maxi HL looking good – and although the cosmetic adjustments over the original 1500 were small, engineering changes transformed the car.
But in reality, as far as Maxi development was concerned, that was about it: the twin-carburettor Maxi HL appeared later on, including a useful hike in power to 91bhp. Beyond that, the Hydrolastic suspension was replaced by Hydradagas and in doing so, the Maxi was brought into line with the rest of the Moulton-suspended range. Finally, in 1980, the Maxi was further, cosmetically facelifted – new bumpers, wheeltrims and interior trim brightened the car, but did not significantly improve it. It was left completely untouched to battle through the Seventies – and it has to be said that although the Maxi never sold in any great numbers, settling down to a steady 20-30,000 a year in the UK, it did pick up a loyal following in the UK.
The Maxi catered to the family man who needed space aplenty and as such, there were few cars that could offer anything approaching its space efficiency. Most car magazines tended to view the Maxi as a small estate car and so, its appeal was unfortunately severely compromised – those that did not and compared it with the Renault 16 (the Maxi's only real rival during its life) found it wanting in too many departments to mount an effective challenge to the charismatic French car.
The last Maxi was produced at Cowley on 8th July 1981.
Conclusion
Looking at the size and weight of the Maxi, it is actually shorter and lighter than the 1998 Ford Focus, but manages to have considerably more room inside – which demonstrates that BMC certainly knew how to obtain the most interior room for any given package. That is manages to beat the Focus – state of the art in 1998 – for packaging speaks volumes for the concept. The ultimate shame for British Leyland was that although the concept of the Maxi was fundamentally a good one, its execution (especially at the start of its life) was quite simply, rubbish.
Maxi 2 incorporating cosmetic improvements appeared towards the end of the car's life, in 1980.
British Leyland could have rescued the car by redesigning the body and interior and pushing this redesigned Maxi as a product to sit in the range where the Allegro finally ended up. The reason for this abandonment of the Maxi is easy to see – it was seen as a product of BMC and, therefore, something from the past - and by the time of its launch, the newly installed British Leyland management was already busying itself planning for the launch of the new company's first car: the Morris Marina.
As Alec Issigonis himself said in 1964, an advanced design only becomes a successful one when, others copy it for themselves. The fact that so few rival designers produced an answer to the Maxi speaks volumes about the car.
1969 Austin Maxi 1500 in "Outdoor pursuits" mode
Maxi Production figures (Cowley)*
| 1968/69 | 1969/70 | 1970/71 | 1971/72 | 1972/73 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 23,294 | 27,618 | 35,742 | 62,783 | 55,357 |
| 1973/74 | 1974/75 | 1975/76 | 1977 | 1978 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 41,639 | 33,132 | 43,983 | 32,479 | 38,567 |
| 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | Total produced |
|---|---|---|---|
| 27,490 | 15,778 | 12,435 | 450,297 |
* Calendar of years:
1968/69 to 1974/75 (October to September)
1975/76 (October 1975 to December 1976 – 15 Months)
1977 onwards (January to December)
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Thanks to Ian Nicholls
